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Along with the reforms to China’s economy, Chinese accounting ﬁrms have undergone rapid development.
At present, there are more than 7400 accounting ﬁrms, over 8.5 million CPAs and nearly 30 million employees
in China. The scopes of the audit business and accounting ﬁrms have gradually increased, along with steady
improvements in the special capabilities of CPAs and the CPA industry’s regulatory standards, making CPAs
an indispensable force for healthy economic and social development. However, due to CPAs’ weak founda-
tions, poor audit quality has attracted attention within the rapid development of accounting ﬁrms. In recent
years, CPAs’ credibility has been increasingly questioned due to frequent cases of accounting fraud.
To accelerate the healthy development of China’s CPA industry, in 2010 the State Council and the Ministry
of Finance issued “The Notice Regarding Several Opinions on Accelerating the Development of the Chinese
CPA Industry” (Guo Ban Fa [2009] No. 56) and the Ministry of Finance and the General Administration for
Industry and Commerce jointly issued “The Regulation on Promoting Large and Medium Accounting Firms
to Transform to Limited Liability Partnerships” (Cai Kuai [2010] No. 12), hereafter referred to together as the
“Regulations.” In response, large accounting ﬁrms were the ﬁrst to change their organizational form from lim-
ited liability to limited liability partnerships (LLPs). This change was expected to improve audit quality by
increasing the legal liability of CPAs. In this study, we examine whether this unique transformation improves
audit quality.
There have been no consistent conclusions made in extant theories on the correlation between such trans-
formations and audit quality. From a risk perspective, the transformation from limited liability to LLPs
increases partners’ legal risks. According to the law, an accounting ﬁrm’s partners must not only compensate
for audit failures through the ﬁrm’s total investment, they may also need to use their personal assets to com-
pensate for audit failures. Therefore, partners may devote more time and eﬀort to supervising the implemen-
tation of audit procedures to improve audit quality. From an organizational perspective, accounting ﬁrms can
beneﬁt from changes in organizational form that provide for sharing and insurance for audit risks and more
opportunities for CPA promotion. However, because the entire transformation process is dominated by the
government, accounting ﬁrms can receive other beneﬁts from the transformation. For example, “The Notice
of Accounting Firm Commitment of Central Governance Enterprises” requires that, under the same condi-
tions, large accounting ﬁrms that have undergone the transformation are recommended to engage in H-share
business and receive priority for audit work for central government business groups. In addition, to participate
in H-share business, accounting ﬁrms must be organized as LLPs. Therefore, transformation is required to
obtain these beneﬁts, which may lead to increased internal conﬂict of interests and reduced audit quality.1
Due to the complicated nature of the transformation’s eﬀect on audit quality, this remains an open question
to be addressed.
We use A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2012 to examine the eﬀect of the transformation of account-
ing ﬁrms’ organizational form on audit quality. We ﬁnd that the transformation has a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on the absolute value of discretionary accruals of audited companies. The results also show that the
transformation signiﬁcantly decreases the level of positive discretionary accruals, but has no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on negative discretionary accruals. We also ﬁnd that the transformation’s positive eﬀect on audit opinions
only lasts for one year.
We also examine the transformation’s eﬀect on audit quality from the perspective of accounting and client
ﬁrms’ characteristics. Unfortunately, we ﬁnd that accounting ﬁrm size and listed company ownership have no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the relationship between the transformation and audit quality. The transformation
increases audit risk due to greater legal obligations, which makes the partners more cautious about undertak-
ing audit work. Meanwhile, the partners are also more cautious in dealing with upward earnings management
behavior, as it is more prone to audit failures. However, given the transformation regulations, the transformed
accounting ﬁrms tend to be larger, but we do not ﬁnd that our results diﬀer by accounting ﬁrm size and listed
company ownership.1 We appreciate the helpful suggestions of the chief editor, Professor Donghui Wu.
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forms of accounting ﬁrms. Firth et al. (2012) study the eﬀects of partnerships and limited liability on audit
quality and ﬁnd that auditors in partnership ﬁrms are more cautious than those in limited liability ﬁrms.
Lennox and Li (2012) studies the eﬀect of transformations from partnerships to LLPs on audit quality and
ﬁnds that it does not reduce audit quality. In this study, we focus on the transformation from limited liability
to a LLP, a transformative direction that diﬀers signiﬁcantly from those previously covered in the literature.
This study also contributes to the reform of the transformation of accounting ﬁrms in China. To meet
ﬁrms’ “bigger, stronger” strategy, the Ministry of Finance and Business Administration jointly issued the Reg-
ulations, requesting that larger accounting ﬁrms transform from limited liability to LLPs. Our study examines
the eﬀect that transformation has on audit quality and the results provide a theoretical reference for the
improvement of the Regulations and the selection of organizational forms for accounting ﬁrms. In this study,
we also make suggestions for the legal liability of CPAs that serve as a reference for situations such as the
recent increase in discussions on the restricted legal liability of CPAs in Europe. In addition, the diﬀerence
in diﬀerence (DID) model used here eﬀectively estimates the Regulations’ inﬂuence to ensure the robustness
and reliability of the results.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops our hypoth-
eses. Section 3 describes the sample and presents the research design. We report the results and robustness tests
in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development
2.1. Institutional background
Accounting ﬁrms require unity and coordination within their ranks and their main functions are realized
through the intellectual input of employees. CPAs are reliant on their professional knowledge, experience
and professional judgment to provide high-quality audit services. Before 1998, almost all of the accounting
ﬁrms in China were state-owned, in that they belonged to the local or central government, universities or gov-
ernment departments (DeFond et al., 2000; Yi, 2003). In 1998, there was a reorganization in which accounting
ﬁrms were required to become independent legal entities without any aﬃliation with their original agencies.
Once this reorganization was completed in 1999, the accounting ﬁrms each chose a form of organization based
on their own conditions, such as limited liability or partnership. Some scholars have argued that in limited
liability accounting ﬁrms, shareholders and auditors’ maximum loss is their investment in the ﬁrm. As their
risk is limited, they are more likely to spend less time and eﬀort in the audit process, or to meet the inappro-
priate requests of customers to keep their clients, which can lead to lower audit quality (Dye, 1993, 1995; Chan
and Pae, 1998). Thus, some scholars have indicated that partnerships should be mandatory. However, this sit-
uation also has inherent defects, such as partners bearing unlimited and joint liability: any partner’s negligence
or malpractice in the practice leads to the punishment of all of the partners, which can result in bankruptcy.
The partnership can prompt extremely mismatched gains and risks, making it unpopular among accounting
ﬁrms. LLPs, however, not only avoid the risk caused by other partners’ improper behavior, but also protect
investors by allowing them to recover their losses from audit failures. Thus, most scholars suggest that LLPs
should be promoted.
There have been many ﬁnancial frauds and audit failure cases in recent years, such as Yinguangxia and
Shenzhen Zhongtianqin (2001), Enron and Andersen (2002), and Kelong and Deloitte (2004). These events
have not only bankrupted ﬁrms, or left them on the verge of bankruptcy, but also strongly compromised over-
all audit quality. These events have seriously damaged the CPA industry’s reputation, prompting the Ministry
of Finance and China Association of Certiﬁed Public Accountants to try and strengthen supervision, improve
audit quality and enhance the protection of investors’ interests. To realize the above mentioned goals, the
State Council [2009] No. 56 and the Ministry of Finance [2010] No. 12 (the Regulations) explicitly require
the transformation of large accounting ﬁrms from limited liability to LLPs.
The LLP, popular in the past 20 years, is a new form of business organization in the United States exclu-
sively for professionals such as accountants, lawyers and doctors. A LLP and a partnership are approximately
the same in that the auditor bears the results of audit failure by suﬀering losses of his own property (unlimited
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tors by overcoming the shortcomings of joint liability inherent in an unlimited liability partnership. The ten-
tative “CPA LLP agreement” states that, “The debt of accounting ﬁrms caused by the mistake of a partner
with intentional or gross negligence in the practice, should ﬁrst be paid with the property of accounting ﬁrms,
and accounting ﬁrms obtain the right of recourse after bearing the liability, and the partner should bear full
liability for the loss of accounting ﬁrms. The debt of accounting ﬁrms caused by the mistake of a partner with-
out intentional or gross negligence in the practice should be paid by all partners with unlimited liability.” In
this study, based on unique events, we examine whether the transformation aﬀects audit quality.2.2. Literature and research hypotheses
The transformation of an accounting ﬁrm’s organizational form increases the risk faced by its partners,
which can result in behavioral changes. Audit risk2 means that an accounting ﬁrm must bear the economic
and even criminal liability when mistakes in the conclusion of its audit report lead to investors or audit clients’
losses. If audit failure occurs, investors are entitled to appeal to the courts to force the listed company to com-
pensate them for their losses. They can also require the accounting ﬁrm to take joint responsibility for the
audit failure. The transformation from limited liability to LLP increases the loss suﬀered by the partner
who experiences audit failure. The partners must take responsible for the liability, which is not limited to their
investment in the accounting ﬁrm, but also includes their personal property.
Some studies have found that audit quality increases with debt risk (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001;
Geiger et al., 2006; Laux and Newman, 2010; Liu and Wang, 2006; Melumad and Thoman, 1990;
Venkataraman et al., 2008). Chan and Pae (1998) ﬁnd that a reduction in debt risk could reduce auditors’
eﬀort, resulting in a lower level of audit quality. They argue that because the users of ﬁnancial statements have
no right to sue the auditor, the auditor fears nothing, resulting in a lack of demand for audit quality. Geiger
and Raghunandan (2001) and Geiger et al. (2006) also ﬁnd that a decline in auditors’ debt risk allows them to
be less cautious in issuing reports, and makes them less likely to issue a going concern audit report. The work
of Firth et al. (2012), based on the special setting of China, examines whether the diﬀerence in debt risk
between two forms of organization (limited liability and partnership) aﬀects auditors’ behavior. They ﬁnd that
the CPAs in partnerships were more cautious and more likely to issue modiﬁed audit opinions, whereas due to
ﬁxed debt risk, limited liability led to more aggressive behavior and the CPAs did not tend to issue modiﬁed
audit opinions. Lennox and Li (2012) study the transformation from partnership to LLP in the United States
and explore whether a reduction in debt risk changed auditors’ behavior. Their results show no signiﬁcant dif-
ference before and after the change in organizational form, possibly because the essence of partnership did not
change and investors still had the right to recover their losses from the auditors.
Based on the transformation of accounting ﬁrms from limited liability to LLPs in China, we analyze
whether an increase in auditors’ debt risk improves audit quality. Debt liability generally comes from lawsuits
against auditors. Legally, if the users of ﬁnancial statements suﬀer losses due to improper audit opinions issued
by auditors, they have the right to require compensation from the auditors. Thus, the debt risk is also closely
associated with the national legal system. Studies have found that accounting ﬁrms in China actually assume a
lower legal risk (Liu and Xu, 2002) because the Chinese audit market is mainly formed by government regu-
lation (Liu and Lin, 2000). Meanwhile, the provisions on CPAs’ legal liability are still relatively vague in China
and the operability is also poor, such as the lack of clear audit quality requirements. In seeking economic inter-
ests, some accounting ﬁrms do not adequately investigate the audited entity when facing ﬁerce competition.
Although some accounting ﬁrms are warned about, ordered to address, or reprimanded for corporate ﬁnancial
reporting irregularities, the processes are limited to administrative penalties, which makes the CPAs’ violation
costs very low. As long as the accounting ﬁrms are not withdrawn, the ﬁrms can still earn money through IPO
and annual audits. Lu and Chen (2005) analyze the relationship between legal risk and audit quality using a
sequential game mode and ﬁnd that legal risk has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on audit quality, possibly due to the
defects in the Chinese judicial system. However, with the improvement of the environment of Chinese laws2 Chen (2006) suggested that audit risk has nine deﬁnitions, and we use the fourth interpretation here to deﬁne audit risk.
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losses occurred by audit failure, auditors attempt to advance their own audit quality control, invest more
resources and work more carefully in the auditing process to reduce the likelihood of audit failures and
thereby reduce litigation risks. Especially when there are changes in an accounting ﬁrm’s organizational form,
the partners face greater debt service obligations when audit failure occurs, which increases audit quality
requirements.
In addition, from an organizational form perspective, the transformation from limited liability to LLP is
more suited to accounting ﬁrms because the integration of human and money capital is better, which helps
improve their internal governance structure and provides a better organizational guarantee for risk manage-
ment and employee promotion. However, because the entire transformation process is basically dominated by
the government and the transformed ﬁrms gain additional beneﬁts, “The Notice of Accounting Firm Commit-
ment of Central Governance Enterprises” requires that, under the same conditions, large accounting ﬁrms that
have undergone transformation are recommended to engage in H-share business and are prioritized to under-
take audit work for central government business groups. In addition, to engage in H-share business, account-
ing ﬁrms must become LLPs. Accounting ﬁrms must transform to obtain these beneﬁts, which may lead to
increased internal conﬂict of interests and reduce audit quality. Thus, we obtain our ﬁrst hypothesis (H1).
H1. The transformation of accounting ﬁrms’ organizational form is unrelated to audit quality.
Although the development of the CPA industry in China is rapid, problems remain, such as a large number
of small-scale accounting ﬁrms, extremely low audit fees, and even “low balling.” The literature has shown
that ﬁrm size correlates with independence and audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981; Subramanian, 1996; Zhang
and Liu, 2002; Qi et al., 2004), such that the larger the accounting ﬁrm, the more independent the auditors
and the higher the audit quality. However, the transformation starts among medium and large accounting
ﬁrms and it may aﬀect audit quality due to the high audit quality of these transformed accounting ﬁrms.
Therefore, we argue that the size of the audit ﬁrm may have a positive eﬀect on the level of audit quality.
H2. If the transformed accounting ﬁrm is a Big Four international accounting ﬁrm, the level of audit quality
is higher.
The audit clients’ characteristics might also eﬀect audit quality. Most of the listed companies in the Chinese
capital market are state-owned, which is a crucial factor for us to consider. Wang et al. (2008) suggest that
state-owned listed companies have an advantage when dealing with ﬁnancial diﬃculties due to governmental
support. As listed companies that were once state-owned show signs of bankruptcy, the government makes an
eﬀort to support the listed companies so they can overcome their diﬃculties. Similarly, auditors face lower
audit risk with state-owned listed companies than with other listed companies, because the probability of audit
failure for the former is low. The transformation changes the debt liability faced by the partners in audit fail-
ure. The characteristics of state-owned listed companies mean that the transformation of accounting ﬁrms has
a limited eﬀect on the audit services for state-owned listed companies. Therefore, we obtain H3.
H3. The eﬀect that the transformation of accounting ﬁrms has on audit quality is more positive for non-state-
owned listed companies than state-owned listed companies.3. Research design
3.1. Variable deﬁnitions and models
3.1.1. Accounting ﬁrm transformations
We deﬁne an accounting ﬁrm that has changed its organizational form from limited liability to LLP as a
transformed ﬁrm (Change, equal to 1). An accounting ﬁrm whose organizational form has not been trans-
formed is a non-transformed ﬁrm (Change, equal to 0). We also deﬁne variables to examine the subsequent
eﬀects of accounting ﬁrm transformations, such as the transformed year (Post0), one year after transformation
(Post1), and two years after transformation (Post2). Given that the current observations only go to 2012, the
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accounting ﬁrm transformations on audit quality.
3.1.2. Audit quality
We use the performance-matched Jones model advanced by Kothari et al. (2005) to ﬁnd the paired com-
pany with the most similar performance for each sample company, with discretionary accruals (DA) gained
through the following regression cross-sectionally within each year and industry. We consider DA as the proxy
for audit quality. The model speciﬁcation is as follows:TAi;t ¼ d0 þ d1ðDSalesi;t  DARi;tÞ þ d2PPEi;t þ d3Roai;t þ ei;t ð1Þ
where total accruals (TAi,t) equal net proﬁt minus net cash ﬂow from operations, the change in sales (DSalesi,t)
equals the sales for the current year minus those for the previous year, the change in accounts receivable
(DARi,t) equals the accounts receivable for the current year minus those for the previous year, (PPEi,t) is
the net amount of property, plant and equipment (PPE) for the current year, with each variable standardized
by total assets for the previous year, and (Roai,t) is the return on assets for the current year. In addition, based
on previous research on audit quality, we use the audit opinion as another proxy for audit quality.
3.1.3. Models
According to Lennox and Li (2012), we use the DID model to examine whether the transformation of
accounting ﬁrms aﬀects audit quality. We focus on the relationship between the transformation (Change)
and DA and further examine the subsequent eﬀects of the transformation event on DA in the current and
post-transformation years. The model speciﬁcations are as follows:DAijt ¼ b0 þ d1Changejt þ b1Ltait þ b2Sizeit þ b3Levit þ b4Invrecit þ b5Roait þ b6Lossit þ b7CFOit
þ b8Tobinqit þ lj þ ai þ eijt ð2Þ
DAijt ¼ b0 þ d1Post0jt þ d2Post1jt þ d3Post2jt þ b1Ltait þ b2Sizeit þ b3Levit þ b4Invrecit þ b5Roait
þ b6Lossit þ b7CFOit þ b8Tobinqit þ lj þ ai þ eijt ð3ÞFollowing Lennox and Li (2012), we control for accounting ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (lj) and listed companies ﬁxed
eﬀects (ai), and examine the diﬀerence in pre- and post-transformation audit quality to ensure that the result is
more robust and reliable.
Following Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Wang et al. (2010), our study includes several control variables, such
as the total accruals for the previous year (Lta), ﬁrm size (Size), debt ratio (Lev), inventories and receivables
ratio (Invrec), proﬁtability (Roa), loss (Loss), cash ratio (CFO) and growth opportunities (Tobinq).
Model (2) is our basic model and is used to examine H1. We also add some relevant variables to model (2)
to create models (4) and (5), which we use to examine H2 and H3. Model (4) tests whether an accounting ﬁrm’s
status as a Big Four accounting ﬁrm inﬂuences the relationship between the transformation and audit quality.
Model (5) tests whether the clients’ status as a state-owned listed company inﬂuenced the relationship between
the transformation and audit quality. The model speciﬁcations are as follows:DAijt ¼ b0 þ d1Changejt þ d2Big4jt þ d3Changejt  Big4jt þ b1Ltait þ b2Sizeit þ b3Levit þ b4Invrecit
þ b5Roait þ b6Lossit þ b7CFOit þ b8Tobinqit þ lj þ ai þ eijt ð4Þ
DAijt ¼ b0 þ d1Changejt þ d2Stateit þ d3Changejt  Stateit þ b1Ltait þ b2Sizeit þ b3Levit þ b4Invrecit
þ b5Roait þ b6Lossit þ b7CFOit þ b8Tobinqit þ lj þ ai þ eijt ð5ÞThe variables’ speciﬁc deﬁnitions and calculations are detailed in Table 1.
3.2. Sample selection
Our study uses all of the A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2012 as our sample. The main variable
(Change) is based on accounting ﬁrm transformations taken from the American Institute of CPAs’ website,
where accounting ﬁrms whose names have changed to LLPs are deﬁned as transformed accounting ﬁrms, with
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variables Deﬁnitions
DA Discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality, calculated from the model developed by Kothari et al. (2005)
Opinion Audit opinion as a proxy for audit quality. The variable Opinion is coded from 0 to 3 for clean, unqualiﬁed by explanatory
notes, qualiﬁed and disclaimed/adverse opinions, respectively
Change Dummy variable that equals 1 if the accounting ﬁrm has been transformed and 0 otherwise
Post0 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the transformation occurs in the current year and 0 otherwise
Post1 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the year is one year after the transformation and 0 otherwise
Post2 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the year is two years after the transformation and 0 otherwise
Big4 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the accounting ﬁrm is a Big Four international accounting ﬁrm and 0 otherwise
State Dummy variable that equals 1 for state-owned listed companies and 0 otherwise
Lta Total accruals of the previous year, calculated as total accruals divided by total assets
Lop Audit opinion of the previous year
Size The size of the company, calculated as the logarithm of total assets
Lev Debt ratio, calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets
Invrec Inventories and receivables ratio, calculated as inventory and accounts receivable divided by total assets
Roa Proﬁtability, calculated as net proﬁt divided by total assets
Loss Dummy variable that equals 1 if the client makes a loss and 0 otherwise
CFO Cash ratio, calculated as net cash ﬂow from operating activities divided by total assets
Tobinq Growth opportunities, calculated as follows: (tradable shares * closing price at the end of the year + non-tradable
shares * net assets per share + book value of debt)/book value of assets
l Dummy variable for accounting ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
a Dummy variables for listed company ﬁxed eﬀects
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from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research and WIND (Wind Information Co., Ltd) databases.
We remove ﬁnancial companies from our sample, along with newly listed companies, specially treated ﬁrms
and ﬁrms with missing variables. We obtain 8705 observations. As many of the variables are the estimated
values of the model that are inﬂuenced by outliers, all of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1%
and 99% levels to ensure the robustness of the results. Table 2 displays details of the accounting ﬁrm trans-
formations by the end of 2012.
The distribution of the ﬁnal sample is shown in Table 3.
4. Empirical results and analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample. The mean and median of DA are
0.001 and 0.002, respectively, indicating that there is no systematic bias in the observations. The mean andTable 2
Transformed accounting ﬁrms.
Transformed accounting ﬁrms Transformation time
RSM China Certiﬁed Public Accountants November 29, 2010
BDO China Shu Lun Pan Certiﬁed Public Accountants December 31, 2010
Crowe Horwath China Certiﬁed Public Accountants February 15, 2011
Pan-China Certiﬁed Public Accountants July 7, 2011
PKF Daxin Certiﬁed Public Accountants January 1, 2012
Da Hua Certiﬁed Public Accountants February 16, 2012
Grant Thornton Certiﬁed Public Accountants June 18, 2012
ShineWing Certiﬁed Public Accountants June 21, 2012
Baker Tilly China Certiﬁed Public Accountants June 29, 2012
CHY Certiﬁed Public Accountants July 5, 2012
KPMG Certiﬁed Public Accountants August 1, 2012
Ernst & Young Certiﬁed Public Accountants September 11, 2012
Deloitte & Touche Certiﬁed Public Accountants October 19, 2012
Table 3
Annual distribution of transformed and non-transformed observations.
Year Non-transformed Transformed Total
2007 1209 1209
2008 1253 1253
2009 1351 1351
2010 1249 204 1453
2011 1068 476 1544
2012 804 1091 1895
Total 6934 1771 8705
286 C. Wang, H. Dou /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 279–293median of audit opinion (Opinion) are 0.064 and 0, respectively. The mean and median of the explanatory
variable (Change) are 0.203 and 0, which is consistent with our sample because a minority of accounting ﬁrms
transformed during the sample period.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the transformed (Change = 1) and non-transformed
(Change = 0) accounting ﬁrms. The mean and median of the absolute value of DA (|DA|) for the transformedTable 4
Descriptive statistics.
Variable name N Mean Sd Min Median Max
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the full sample
DA 8705 0.001 0.086 0.436 0.002 0.492
Opinion 8703 0.064 0.357 0 0 3
Change 8705 0.203 0.403 0 0 1
Post0 8705 0.084 0.277 0 0 1
Post1 8705 0.073 0.260 0 0 1
Post2 8705 0.047 0.211 0 0 1
Top 4 8703 0.063 0.243 0 0 1
State 8705 0.585 0.493 0 1 1
Lta 8705 0.007 0.085 0.314 0.010 0.330
Size 8705 21.835 1.241 19.124 21.699 25.878
Lev 8705 0.493 0.197 0.047 0.505 0.917
Invrec 8705 0.268 0.181 0.002 0.242 0.824
Roa 8705 0.040 0.068 2.746 0.035 0.532
Loss 8705 0.081 0.273 0 0 1
CFO 8705 0.048 0.081 0.235 0.046 0.307
Tobinq 8705 2.037 1.248 0.896 1.635 10.726
Mean Median
Change = 1 Change = 0 Change = 1 Change = 0
(1) (2) (1)–(2) (3) (4) (3)–(4)
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the transformed and non-transformed groups
|DA| 0.053 0.060 0.007*** 0.038 0.043 0.005***
Opinion 0.036 0.064 0.028*** 0 0 0***
Big4 0.040 0.063 0.023*** 0 0 0***
State 0.518 0.585 0.067*** 1 1 0***
Lta 0.012 0.007 0.019*** 0.008 0.010 0.018***
Size 22.015 21.835 0.180*** 21.849 21.699 0.150***
Lev 0.472 0.493 0.021*** 0.486 0.505 0.019***
Invrec 0.280 0.268 0.012*** 0.254 0.242 0.012***
Roa 0.041 0.040 0.002 0.034 0.035 0.001
Loss 0.076 0.081 0.005 0 0 0
CFO 0.042 0.048 0.006*** 0.041 0.046 0.005***
Tobinq 1.836 2.037 0.201*** 1.460 1.635 0.175***
Note: The third and sixth columns in Panel B are t-tests for the mean and non-parametric tests for the median, respectively.
Table 5
The eﬀect of accounting ﬁrm transformations on audit quality.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Regression results for full sample
Change 0.009*** 0.010***
(4.19) (4.48)
Post0 0.005** 0.007***
(2.08) (2.63)
Post1 0.012*** 0.014***
(3.93) (4.20)
Post2 0.018*** 0.019***
(4.23) (4.32)
Lta 0.013 0.013
(0.79) (0.80)
Size 0.005** 0.006***
(2.43) (2.66)
Lev 0.041*** 0.040***
(4.26) (4.16)
Invrec 0.017 0.017
(1.64) (1.63)
Roa 0.095*** 0.094***
(6.49) (6.41)
Loss 0.003 0.004
(1.16) (1.18)
CFO 0.021 0.021
(1.19) (1.16)
Tobinq 0.003*** 0.003***
(3.52) (3.44)
Constant 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.090* 0.101**
(7.97) (7.97) (1.96) (2.18)
CPA ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control Control Control
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control Control Control
Observations 8608 8608 8608 8608
Adjusted R-squared 0.0157 0.0169 0.0282 0.0293
DA > 0 DA < 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: Regression results for signed discretionary accruals
Change 0.017*** 0.002
(4.16) (0.63)
Post0 0.015*** 0.000
(3.13) (0.011)
Post1 0.020*** 0.005
(3.52) (0.99)
Post2 0.022*** 0.006
(2.80) (1.02)
Lta 0.024 0.024 0.051** 0.050**
(0.86) (0.84) (2.03) (2.01)
Size 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.008** 0.007**
(3.63) (3.69) (2.52) (2.38)
Lev 0.007 0.007 0.075*** 0.074***
(0.43) (0.42) (5.35) (5.30)
Invrec 0.033* 0.033* 0.100*** 0.100***
(1.88) (1.89) (6.24) (6.23)
Roa 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.118*** 0.117***
(4.27) (4.26) (4.22) (4.21)
Loss 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007
(0.20) (0.24) (1.52) (1.53)
(continued on next page)
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Table 5 (continued)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
CFO 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.043* 0.044*
(2.61) (2.60) (1.65) (1.67)
Tobinq 0.003 0.003 0.003*** 0.003***
(1.64) (1.60) (3.14) (3.09)
Constant 0.258*** 0.265*** 0.193*** 0.185***
(3.14) (3.20) (2.87) (2.74)
CPA ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control Control Control
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control Control Control
Observations 4181 4181 4427 4427
Adjusted R-squared 0.0603 0.0607 0.0538 0.0542
Note: The dependent variable is |DA|. The t-statistics are presented in brackets below the coeﬃcients.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level, using two-tailed tests.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level, using two-tailed tests.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level, using two-tailed tests.
Table 6
The eﬀect of accounting ﬁrm transformations on audit opinions.
Variable (1) (2)
Change 0.001
(0.12)
Post0 0.014
(1.12)
Post1 0.026*
(1.69)
Post2 0.007
(0.33)
Lta 0.151*** 0.152***
(13.4) (13.5)
Size 0.042*** 0.042***
(4.27) (4.31)
Lev 0.292*** 0.293***
(6.60) (6.61)
Invrec 0.250*** 0.249***
(5.17) (5.16)
Roa 0.646*** 0.646***
(9.40) (9.40)
Loss 0.035** 0.035**
(2.50) (2.54)
CFO 0.075 0.077
(1.58) (1.62)
Tobinq 0.007* 0.007*
(1.79) (1.87)
Constant 1.007*** 1.019***
(4.66) (4.70)
CPA ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control
Observations 8607 8607
Adjusted R-squared 0.0989 0.0998
Note: The dependent variable is Opinion. The t-statistics are presented in brackets below the coeﬃcients.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level, using two-tailed tests.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level, using two-tailed tests.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level, using two-tailed tests.
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Table 7
The eﬀect of the accounting ﬁrm size.
Variable (1) All (2) DA > 0 (3) DA < 0
Change 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.002
(4.26) (4.07) (0.63)
Big4 0.000 0.022 0.009
(0.015) (0.60) (0.40)
Change * Big4 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.24) (0.026) (0.099)
Lta 0.013 0.025 0.051**
(0.79) (0.88) (2.03)
Size 0.005** 0.013*** 0.008**
(2.42) (3.62) (2.51)
Lev 0.041*** 0.007 0.075***
(4.25) (0.43) (5.36)
Invrec 0.017 0.033* 0.100***
(1.64) (1.88) (6.23)
Roa 0.095*** 0.089*** 0.118***
(6.48) (4.26) (4.23)
Loss 0.004 0.001 0.007
(1.17) (0.20) (1.52)
CFO 0.021 0.081*** 0.043
(1.19) (2.59) (1.65)
Tobinq 0.003*** 0.003 0.003***
(3.52) (1.63) (3.14)
Constant 0.090* 0.257*** 0.192***
(1.95) (3.13) (2.86)
CPA ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control Control
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control Control
Observations 8608 4181 4427
Adjusted R-squared 0.0282 0.0605 0.0539
Note: The dependent variable is |DA|. The t-statistics are presented in brackets below the coeﬃcients.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level, using two-tailed tests.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level, using two-tailed tests.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level, using two-tailed tests.
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ﬁrm transformation improves audit quality. In the analysis of the dummy variable (Big4), the transformed
group is signiﬁcantly lower than the non-transformed group, which is due to the late transformation of the
Big Four accounting ﬁrms in 2011, and thus there are fewer observations. Similarly, the dummy variable
(State) of the transformed group is also signiﬁcantly lower than the non-transformed group.4.2. Empirical results and analysis
4.2.1. The eﬀect of accounting ﬁrm transformations on audit quality
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of the eﬀect of accounting ﬁrm transformations on absolute DA.
Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A are the regression results without the control variables. The variable (Change)
is negative and signiﬁcant (the coeﬃcients are 0.009 and 0.010, and the t-statistics are 4.19 and 4.48,
respectively) in columns (1) and (3) of Panel A. Accounting ﬁrm transformations are thus signiﬁcantly nega-
tively related to the absolute value of DA, supporting H1. We suggest that the transformation of accounting
ﬁrms increases the audit and debt risks faced by partners of accounting ﬁrms, which urges the partners to be
more cautious and prudent in the auditing process, improving audit quality. We further analyze the post-
transformation eﬀects among accounting ﬁrms. The variable (Post0) is negative and signiﬁcant (the coeﬃcients
are 0.005 and 0.007, and the t-statistics equal 2.18 and 2.63) in columns (2) and (4), which indicates that
the transformation of accounting ﬁrms has a positive eﬀect on audit quality in the transformation year. Like-
Table 8
The eﬀect of listed company ownership.
Variable (1) All (2) DA > 0 (3) DA < 0
Change 0.012*** 0.022*** 0.001
(3.53) (3.50) (0.12)
State 0.002 0.004 0.001
(0.72) (0.61) (0.24)
Change * State 0.002 0.007 0.004
(0.62) (1.03) (0.81)
Lta 0.013 0.024 0.050**
(0.80) (0.85) (2.01)
Size 0.005** 0.013*** 0.008**
(2.41) (3.59) (2.51)
Lev 0.041*** 0.007 0.075***
(4.24) (0.43) (5.37)
Invrec 0.017 0.034* 0.101***
(1.63) (1.91) (6.25)
Roa 0.095*** 0.089*** 0.119***
(6.47) (4.27) (4.26)
Loss 0.003 0.001 0.007
(1.12) (0.17) (1.56)
CFO 0.021 0.081*** 0.043*
(1.20) (2.60) (1.66)
Tobinq 0.003*** 0.003* 0.003***
(3.54) (1.65) (3.15)
Constant 0.091** 0.257*** 0.191***
(1.97) (3.13) (2.84)
CPA ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control Control
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control Control
Observations 8608 4181 4427
Adjusted R-squared 0.0284 0.0610 0.0540
Note: The dependent variable is |DA|. The t-statistics are presented in brackets below the coeﬃcients.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level, using two-tailed tests.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level, using two-tailed tests.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level, using two-tailed tests.
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transformation of accounting ﬁrms still has positive eﬀects on audit quality one and two years after the trans-
formation. Further, the above results show that the coeﬃcients of the variables are Post2 < Post1 < Post0,
which indicates that the transformation year’s eﬀect is weaker than that of one and two years after the trans-
formation. We argue that the partners of transformed accounting ﬁrms fully realize the possible increase in
audit risk, and thus they are more cautious in the audit process, resulting in improved audit quality.
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results for signed DA. The coeﬃcient of the variable (Change) is 0.017 and
signiﬁcant at the 1% level in column (1). However, the coeﬃcient of the variable (Change) is 0.002 and insig-
niﬁcant in column (3). The above results show that improvements in audit quality are mainly due to a reduc-
tion in upward earnings management, with no eﬀect on downward earnings management. Further, the
variables (Post1) and (Post2) are consistent with the above results.
To test the direct eﬀect of accounting ﬁrm transformations on audit quality, we also use audit opinions as a
proxy for audit quality. Column (1) of Table 6 shows that the coeﬃcient of the variable (Change) is 0.001,
but is not signiﬁcant.3 The coeﬃcient of the variable (Post1) is 0.026 and signiﬁcant at the 10% level in column3 DeFond and Zhang (2014) indicate that, because the proxies in each category reﬂect diﬀerent dimensions of audit quality, they cannot
entirely reﬂect audit quality. Our research question is whether the transformation of accounting ﬁrms improves audit quality given their
increased audit risk. The auditors usually issue modiﬁed audit opinions when listed companies have major uncertainty in their operations,
or when the companies obey the accounting principles and occur signiﬁcant accounting errors. Therefore, the use of audit opinions to
proxy for audit quality might ignore the tiny diﬀerences in the audit process.
Table 9
The eﬀect of accounting ﬁrm size and listed company ownership on the relationship between transformation and audit quality.
Variable (1) All (2) DA > 0 (3) DA < 0
Change 0.012*** 0.022*** 0.000
(3.48) (3.47) (0.096)
Big4 0.000 0.022 0.010
(0.027) (0.60) (0.41)
Change * Big4 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.32) (0.048) (0.23)
State 0.002 0.004 0.001
(0.71) (0.61) (0.25)
Change * State 0.003 0.007 0.005
(0.65) (1.02) (0.84)
Lta 0.013 0.025 0.050**
(0.79) (0.88) (2.01)
Size 0.005** 0.013*** 0.008**
(2.41) (3.57) (2.49)
Lev 0.041*** 0.007 0.076***
(4.24) (0.43) (5.38)
Invrec 0.017 0.034* 0.100***
(1.63) (1.91) (6.24)
Roa 0.095*** 0.089*** 0.119***
(6.47) (4.26) (4.27)
Loss 0.003 0.001 0.007
(1.13) (0.17) (1.55)
CFO 0.021 0.081*** 0.043*
(1.19) (2.59) (1.66)
Tobinq 0.003*** 0.003 0.003***
(3.54) (1.64) (3.14)
Constant 0.091** 0.256*** 0.190***
(1.96) (3.11) (2.83)
CPA ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control Control
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect Control Control Control
Observations 8608 4181 4427
Adjusted R-squared 0.0284 0.0612 0.0541
Note: The dependent variable is |DA|. The t-statistics are presented in brackets below the coeﬃcients.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level, using two-tailed tests.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level, using two-tailed tests.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level, using two-tailed tests.
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formation, possibly because accounting ﬁrms must take time to address post-transformation quality control,
thereby enhancing the audit quality of the audit services provided for listed companies.
4.2.2. The eﬀect of accounting ﬁrm size
Table 7 presents the results of the relationship between transformation and audit quality by dividing the
sample into two groups: Big Four and non-Big Four. The coeﬃcients of the interact terms (Change * Big4)
are all insigniﬁcant in columns (1)–(3), which indicate that there is no incremental eﬀect of accounting ﬁrm
transformations on audit quality when distinguishing by ﬁrm size. One possible reason is that the audit quality
of Big Four accounting ﬁrms is always higher and therefore the potential for further improvement is limited.
Therefore, even though the audit risk faced by the partners increases after the transformation, there is no sig-
niﬁcant incremental eﬀect on audit quality.
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Table 8 presents the results of the relationship between the transformations and audit quality after divid-
ing the sample into two groups, state-owned and non-state-owned. The coeﬃcients of the interaction term
(Change * State) are all insigniﬁcant in columns (1)–(3), which indicate that there is no incremental eﬀect of
accounting ﬁrm transformations on audit quality when distinguishing by the nature of ownership of listed
companies.
4.3. Robustness tests
4.3.1. Diﬀerent estimations of discretionary accruals
To ensure that the conclusions of this study are not inﬂuenced by the estimation of DA, we also use the
performance-matched Jones model, the median-adjusted Jones model and the modiﬁed Jones model to esti-
mate DA. After repeating the above regression analysis, the results are still robust, indicating that the conclu-
sions of this study are not inﬂuenced by the estimation of DA.
4.3.2. Diﬀerent deﬁnitions of audit opinion
To ensure that our conclusions are not aﬀected by the deﬁnition of audit opinions, we also deﬁne clean
audit opinions as 0 and modiﬁed audit opinions as 1. The results are still robust, indicating that our conclu-
sions are not aﬀected by the deﬁnition of audit opinions.
4.3.3. Diﬀerent model speciﬁcations
We also simultaneously examine the eﬀects of accounting ﬁrm size and listed company ownership nature on
the relationship between transformations and audit quality. We ﬁnd that the results are the same (see Table 9),
indicating that the conclusions do not change.
5. Conclusions
We use Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2012 to examine the eﬀects of accounting ﬁrm trans-
formations on audit quality. We ﬁnd that accounting ﬁrm transformations are negatively related to the abso-
lute value of DA. The results of signed DA show that when DA is positive, accounting ﬁrm transformations
signiﬁcantly reduce the level of DA, whereas the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant when DA is negative. We also ﬁnd that
accounting ﬁrm transformations only have a positive eﬀect on audit opinions one year after the
transformation.
We examine the eﬀects of accounting ﬁrm transformations on audit quality from the characteristics of each
accounting ﬁrm and each client, to explore the research question more deeply. However, we do not ﬁnd that
accounting ﬁrm size and listed company ownership signiﬁcantly aﬀect the relationship between transforma-
tions and audit quality. The transformation from limited liability to LLP increases the audit risk faced by
the partners of accounting ﬁrms, especially in lawsuits after audit failure, as the partners must compensate
for the loss with all of their investments and their personal assets. Therefore, faced with an increasing debt
risk, the partners tend to focus more on implementing audit procedures and using audit tools, which improve
audit quality. Partners are more cautious in dealing with upward earnings management behavior because it is
more prone to audit failures. Due to the policy, transformed accounting ﬁrms are generally larger in size and
their clients are of a higher quality. Therefore, we did not ﬁnd diﬀerences based on accounting ﬁrm size and
listed company ownership.
In this study, we ﬁnd that accounting ﬁrm transformations improve audit quality, providing policymakers
with important empirical evidence. Likewise, the continual implementation of the policy can have a positive
eﬀect, urging auditors to provide higher quality audit services that make the capital market more transparent.
With the increase in transformed accounting ﬁrms, future studies will have more reliable data to work with.
These transformations will aﬀect the insurance functions of audits, audit fees and audit client choice, etc.,
which can also form future directions for research on the topic of accounting ﬁrm transformations.
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